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Abstract. Computer technology enables the creation of detailed docu-
mentation about the processes that create or aﬀect entities (data, objects,
etc.). Such documentation of the past can be used to answer various kinds
of questions regarding the processes that led to the creation or modiﬁca-
tion of a particular entity. The answer to such questions are known as an
entity’s provenance. In this paper, we derive a number of principles for
documenting the past, grounded in work from philosophy and history,
which allow for provenance questions to be answered within a computa-
tional context. These principles lead us to argue that an interaction-based
model is particularly suited for representing high quality documentation
of the past.
History is important: in order to make progress in the future, it is important
to learn the lessons of the past. History, therefore, becomes a vital resource for
progressive societies. History is based on evidence or documentation of events
that occurred in the past. Computer technology enables documentation to be
produced that is more accurate and comprehensive than previously possible.
Given the quantity of documentation that can be generated by computer systems
(for example those running e-Science applications), what kind of documentation
should be created that enables historians and users to most eﬀectively answer
questions they have about the past. To answer these questions, we argue for two
principles for the creation of, what we term, high quality documentation of the
past. One principle guarantees that users of documentation of the past have a
precise semantics for it. The other principle guarantees that there exists a link
between documentation and its creators. Together these principles are the ﬁrst
contribution of this paper.
A question that is often posed by historians and users regards the provenance
of an entity (object, data item, etc..): what was the process that led to the entity
in question? To enable the answering of provenance questions in a manner that
conforms with the aforementioned principles, we introduce a model of documen-
tation based on the exchange of messages between actors. The justiﬁcation of
this model is the second contribution of this paper.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. We begin with a more detailed
motivation of our work. After which, three assumptions about the world arepresented. We then present two principles of high quality documentation. Each
principle is grounded in work from philosophy and history. Finally, we argue for
the adoption of a model, based on interactions between computational programs,
as a representation of past documentation that ﬁts both provenance and the
principles outlined.
1 Motivation
Historical records are typically produced by historians weaving together scat-
tered pieces of documentation to tell a story of past events and their relationships
with one another [8]. Today, human activity is becoming increasingly automated
with the aid of computational systems, which perform part or, in some cases, all
of processes previously undertaken solely by humans. Interestingly, this means
that activities in scientiﬁc, commercial and industrial settings are increasingly
represented in computational systems, which presents an opportunity: it be-
comes possible to capture what happens in these settings both accurately and
comprehensively.
The large amount of documentation that can be generated by computer sys-
tems changes the role of the historian, from someone who deduces history from
paltry evidence to one who sifts through detailed documentation in order to
make sense of history for others. If historians are to play this role, how can
we ensure their task is simpliﬁed and facilitated? More speciﬁcally, how can
computer scientists provide the correct kinds of documentation to facilitate the
description and analysis of processes that have occurred and are captured within
computational systems?
In this paper, we answer these questions for documentation about the func-
tioning of computer systems. Furthermore, we take into account a speciﬁc type
of historical question: provenance. Answering provenance questions about enti-
ties places requirements on the documentation of the past. In order to refer to
the history of an entity as it existed at a point in time, or in the context of a
speciﬁc event, documentation of the processes the entity goes through must exist
up to and including that point in time. For instance, to track the provenance of
a Renaissance painting, the owner needs to know both its owner in 1990 as well
as its owner in 1800 and, preferably, all of the owners in between. The documen-
tation must also be able to include information from several sources. Referring
to our painting example, one source may give the ownership information for a
painting in 1800, while another may provide it for 1990. Considering these re-
quirements within computational systems, we derive a number of principles of
documentation of the past that make it possible to ﬁnd the provenance of data
items. We term documentation of the past that conforms to these principles
high quality documentation, which is the kind of documentation that we believe
historians and users should be sifting through as they answer questions about
the provenance of data items.
We now argue for our principles of high quality documentation of the past.2 Three basic assumptions
The set of principles we intend to outline are based on a number of assumptions
about the world. We believe these assumptions to be reasonable, but given that
they are philosophical in nature, they are open to debate. We abstain from
such debate here and instead encourage the reader to consult the philosophical
literature (such as [9]).
We postulate that historians as well as others take a realist view of the world
in everyday life. A general deﬁnition of realism is given in our ﬁrst assumption:
Assumption 1 (Realism) “a, b, and c and so on exist, and the fact that they
exist and have properties such as F-ness, G-ness, and H-ness is independent of
anyone’s beliefs, linguistic practices, conceptual schemes, and so on.” [3]
That is to say, things like computers, paper and post-it notes as well as their
attributes of being rectangular, made of wood, yellow in colour are independent
of what anyone thinks of them. People tend to believe that cars, post-it notes,
and magazines exist without having to be there to see them. Extending this
concept, we introduce the assumption of veriﬁcation.
Assumption 2 (Veriﬁcation) Observers can check the existence of all entities
and their properties independently from other observers.
The implication of this assumption is, for example, if an observer claims that
there is a large red dinosaur outside their oﬃce window, another observer who is
there at the same time can check whether this is the case or not. The ability to
verify is dependent on two things: the independence of the environment from the
observer (a consequence of realism) and the observers’ senses not malfunctioning.
Our ﬁnal assumption is as follows:
Assumption 3 (Truthful representation) Users of documentation of the past,
such as historians, want documentation to be an accurate or truthful represen-
tation of what occurred.
In essence, the more detailed, accurate, and truthful portrait of the past
given, the more users’ analyses can be supported and buttressed. With these
assumptions in mind, we now describe principles for high quality documentation.
We begin with a discussion of truth.
3 Truth and factuality
As stated in Assumption 3, we assume that users want documentation of the past
to be truthful. To establish that documentation does indeed truthfully represent
the past, we must ﬁnd a deﬁnition of truth that works with respect to both
computational systems and the past. We begin by presenting a theory of truth
that ﬁts our assumptions. We then show how the assumption of veriﬁcation isbroken with respect to computer systems. The veriﬁcation assumption is then
discarded and we develop a new principle, based on the theory of truth we
present, that provides documentation of the past for computational systems
with a precise semantics.
From Assumption 1, the correspondence theory of truth seems to be the
standard defensible theory of truth that we should adopt [7]. It is deﬁned as
follows:
Deﬁnition 1 (Correspondence theory of truth). “A proposition is true
just in case (if and only if) it corresponds to fact or the world.” [7]
That is to say, if a statement is expressed and it corresponds (or can be
mapped) to the world, then it is true.1 The correspondence theory means that
statements can be veriﬁed by observing what they correspond to. Assumption 2
holds in the real world. Humans can check if statements are true by observing
the world. They can observe whether or not a large red dinosaur is outside the
oﬃce window.
In computer systems, however, the assumption of veriﬁcation does not work.
Software programs or components, which we call actors, do not have independent
access to a common element (piece of hardware, software, component). There is
no equivalent to the independently accessible environment present in the physical
world. Instead, actors rely on information communicated between themselves.
For example, to access the hard drive, an application program communicates
with the operating system, which communicates with the driver program which
accesses the physical drive and provides the data back through the chain. The
application program’s access to the hard drive is mediated by other programs.
It does not have independent access to the hard drive. The only actor that can
know directly the contents of the hard drive is the driver program. If it receives
six diﬀerent requests and provides the same data back for every request, no other
actor would be able to detect if that was an incorrect or correct response.
In distributed computational systems, actors’ dependence on communication
is further emphasised by their spatial isolation. For an actor executing in com-
puter A to know about the state of computer B, it must receive information
from an actor executing in computer B. There is no other way for an actor in
A to gain direct knowledge of computer B. Therefore, unlike a human, an actor
cannot readily verify the state of the world independently of the information it
receives from other actors. If an actor executing on computer A makes a propo-
sition about the state of computer A, even if that proposition corresponds to
the world, an actor on another computer cannot verify the truthfulness of the
proposition. Hence, the assumption of veriﬁcation does not hold in a computer
system.
Given this problem, we make explicit what actors can verify to be truthful.
Actors come to know the world via communication. They observe the world
through the receipt of information. Therefore, an actor can determine whether
a proposition is true with respect to what it observes. The statement “actor
1 Throughout this paper, we will use “statement” and “proposition” interchangeably.A received data item X” can be veriﬁed by actor A as being true or false.
However, no other actor can verify that statement. In a computational system,
the veriﬁcation of a statement is dependent both on its correspondence to a fact
and the actor that observed the fact.
Therefore, the correspondence theory of truth still holds in computational
systems except that only an actor that has observed a particular event can know
whether a proposition about it is true. This implies that other actors as well
as users cannot know whether or not documentation about what happened in
computer systems is true. Hence, we are led to the notion that documentation
cannot be independently veriﬁed as truth. Instead, for every statement in doc-
umentation of the past, a user must make a judgement about its veracity. To
enable this sort of judgement we introduce the following principle.
Principle 1 (Factuality) As part of documentation of the past, actors must
only record propositions that they can verify to be true, where truth is deﬁned by
the correspondence theory of truth.
Actors, then, should only make statements about what they observe, but not
about guesses or inferences about the world. If this principle is followed, users of
documentation can know that statements represent reality at that time for the
actors who made them. This is a powerful notion. Documentation created using
Principle 1 can be interpreted as representing the reality of the computer system
assuming that the users believe the actors that created the documentation. This
notion is currently not enforced by most provenance systems. Scientiﬁc Annota-
tion Middleware [5], for example, allows actors to record inferences about what
other actors have done.
4 He said, she said
In the previous section, we stated that users should interpret documentation
as statements by actors in computer systems about what they have observed.
Documentation about the past then acts as evidence that the past occurred in
some manner. Evidence plays a critical role in society. Historians, juries and
others rely on evidence to make judgements about the past and predict what
will happen in the future. In a legal setting, evidence is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 (Evidence). “Evidence is information, whether in the form of
personal testimony, the language of documents, or the production of material
objects that is given in a legal investigation, to establish the fact or point in
question” (Oxford English Dictionary)
We now draw a parallel between the statements that make up the documen-
tation of the past for a computer system and a particular type of evidence in a
legal setting, testimony. Coady (p. 33) gives a six point list of how testimony in
a legal setting can be identiﬁed [1]. We enumerate the most pertinent here.
1. Testimony is a form of evidence.2. Testimony is constituted by persons A oﬀering their remarks as evidence so
that we are invited to accept p because A says that p.
3. The person oﬀering the remarks is in a position to do so, i.e. he has the
relevant authority, competence, or credentials. Within English law and pro-
ceedings inﬂuenced by it, the testimony is normally required to be ﬁrsthand
(i.e. not hearsay).
The statements made by actors are similar to testimony. They are evidence
that something happened in a computer system. We are invited to accept a
statement by an actor because the actor states it. Furthermore, the actor, from
the principle of factuality, should have ﬁrsthand knowledge of what occurred.
Just like eyewitnesses to a crime scene testifying in court, actors provide state-
ments as to how things were at a particular time, hopefully without inference.
However, just like testimony from people, statements made by actors may be
incomplete, inaccurate or misconstrued.
Users of documentation of the past must then play a similar role to juries. Just
as juries make a judgement about whether to believe the set of claims provided
by an eyewitness, users must make the same judgement about documentation
of the past. Such judgements are usually based on the source of the evidence.
Users can interpret documentation based on a variety of factors: e.g. what other
actors state about the source, the actor’s past performance, the content of the
documentation.2 The key to making this judgement is to know the creator of
the statement. Therefore, it is fundamental that documentation about the past
in computer systems be attributable, which is our second principle.
Principle 2 (Attribution) Each statement making up documentation of the
past for a computer system must be attributable to a particular actor.
We have argued that documentation of the past for computer systems should
be both attributable and factual. We now endorse a particular model for repre-
senting documentation of the past.
5 Endorsing a model
We have developed mechanisms to record documentation about the processes ex-
ecuting in computational systems [2]. These mechanisms adopt a speciﬁc model
centered on message exchanges, termed interactions. We now argue that an in-
teraction model that follows the aforementioned principles is best suited for
representing documentation. The interaction model is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 3 (Interaction Model). In the interaction model, a system is
composed of actors that exchange information via interactions. An interaction
2 A user is determining whether to trust an actor. The concept of trust and related
research are outside the scope of this paper. We refer the reader to [6] for more
in-depth discussions of trust in computational systemsconsists of one actor sending a message and another receiving the same mes-
sage. Actors receive no data other than via interactions, i.e. there is no external
environment.
Following Milner [4], we argue that any computational system can be de-
scribed using the concepts of the interaction model. From this model, we can
deﬁne a form of documentation that describes a system according to that model.
Deﬁnition 4 (Interaction Model Documentation). Documentation of the
past that describes a system according to the interaction model is called interac-
tion model documentation.
From the principle of factuality, actors should only document what they ob-
serve. This means that the documentation produced by one actor will be created
independently from that produced by any others. Given that determining the
provenance of a data item, which can include events spanning time and space,
may require examining documentation from multiple actors, we need to know
when multiple actors are providing documentation of the same event. According
to Section 2, the observations made by actors cannot, in themselves, be indepen-
dently veriﬁed but this does not prevent a historian from inferring that multiple
actors’ observations are of the same or connected events from the content of the
documentation.
There are two ways that a connection between actors’ observations can be
inferred from interaction model documentation. First, in some cases, something
about where the content of an actor’s observations came from can be inferred
from that content. For example, the port which an actor received TCP/IP com-
munication on may be apparent from the documentation of that communication.
Moreover, in some cases the actual actor that the content came from can be in-
ferred, e.g. a message may be digitally signed so the author can be determined.
In this way, we can infer a connection between the data received by one actor
and the observations of another actor (the sender).
Second, we can infer explicit connections between actors’ communications. In
a system of actors with no shared world to observe, connections between actors’
observations can only be made if it is apparent when some data was sent by an
actor over the communication medium. Since observation is the receipt of data,
an actor will observe, and so can document, receiving a message from another
actor but will not directly observe the sending of a message. Fortunately, some
observations can be inferred as indirectly documenting information leaving an
actor. For example, the content of documentation can imply that data is about
to be sent by the actor over the wire, with the intention of reaching another
actor. Where an actor receives feedback that it is sending or has sent data, it can
document this feedback and a historian can infer that it sent the data. Given
this, it can be inferred that where actor A recorded receiving data, actor B
recorded (feedback on) sending data, the data has identical content and each
message communicated can be safely assumed to be unique, then we can infer
that the actors’ observations are of the same message.The interaction model connects what would be, in an event-based model,
for example, isolated, disconnected and unrelated events into connected, related
and meaningful observations that, taken together, allow descriptions of coherent
processes.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed two principles that documentation about the
past for computational systems should abide by to be considered high quality.
First, we argued for creating factual documentation so that users have a precise
semantics in which to interpret documentation. The argument was grounded in
a philosophical investigation into what would make for a truthful representation
of the past. Second, based on the observation that statements made by com-
putational actors are equivalent to testimony in a court of law, we derived the
necessity for attributable documentation. Finally, an interaction model was en-
dorsed as an eﬀective computational model for representing the past, especially
in comparison with event based models.
If historians or any users are to eﬀectively use documentation of the past for
provenance, they must understand the underlying principles that were used in
the generation of it. Therefore, it is critical that the community enumerate and
justify these principles. This paper is the ﬁrst to state such principles explicitly.
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